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No Means No, But Silence Means Yes? The Policy
and Constitutionality of the Recent State Proposals for
Opt-Out Organ Donation Laws
Sara Naomi Rodriguez
I. INTRODUCTION
Waiting. That is what 113,555 people in this country in need of
1
life-saving organ transplants are doing right now. They are waiting
for the phone call that will usher in a second chance at life. However,
for many of those on the organ transplant waitlist, that phone call will
not come in time. They will die while waiting because the demand for
transplantable organs in this country greatly exceeds the available
supply.2 This is particularly true for those in need of kidney transplants  and the gap appears to be growing larger each year.3
Undeniably, it is a horrific scenario. But what is particularly frustrating about the shortage of transplantable organs is that the reality
of the crisis is not reflected in public opinion surveys, which consistently show that the majority of Americans are open to the idea of organ donation.4 For example, in a 2005 Gallup national survey, 95% of
those surveyed said they “support or strongly support organ donation.”5 Further, 78% of those surveyed said they “would be likely or
6
very likely to have their organs donated after their death.” Both of
J.D., 2012, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to thank the
following: Professor Thomas E. Baker, for helping me find my way; my parents, for their love
and sacrifice so that anything was possible; my sister, for setting the bar high; Chris, for bringing
fun into my life; Shari, for being my inspiration, always.
1
Based on data as of March 21, 2012. The Need is Real, ORGANDONOR.GOV,
http://organdonor.gov/index.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
2
See 2009 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, HRSA, http://www.ustransplant.org/annual_
reports/current/default.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
3
See 2009 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 2.
4
See 2005 National Survey of Organ and Tissue Donation Attitudes and Behaviors, THE
GALLUP ORG., ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/organdonor/survey2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Gallup survey]; Sean R. Fitzgibbons, Cadaveric Organ Donation and Consent: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73,
85 (1999).
5
Gallup survey, supra note 4, at 3.
6
Id.
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these figures represent increases from 1993 when the Gallup national
7
survey was last conducted. Based on current death rates, these figures seem to suggest that there should be an ample, if not surplus,
8
supply of transplantable organs in the United States. The reality,
however, is that thousands of people die every year while waiting for
an organ transplant that will never happen because there are just not
enough organ donors.9 So, where is the disconnect? If so many
Americans are willing to donate their organs after death, why is the
United States currently facing the greatest shortage of donor kidneys
in a decade?10 Many believe that the disconnect stems from the ability
of the decedent’s next of kin to intervene in the organ donation decision.11 Currently, in situations where the decedent’s organ donor status is unknown, doctors must obtain consent from the decedent’s next
of kin before procuring organs for transplantation.12 Unaware of what
their deceased loved one’s wishes would have been, family members
often “err on the side of caution” in such situations and refuse to provide consent.13 However, even where the decedent’s wishes to be an
organ donor are known, doctors are often hesitant to procure organs
14
over the objection of the decedent’s next of kin.
Whatever the reason for the disconnect, both the federal and
state governments have employed various methods in an effort to increase the number of organ donors in the United States, including
revised organ donation legislation,15 government funded research,16
17
and public awareness and education initiatives. The latest attempt
7

See id.
See Christy M. Watkins, A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations’ Organ Procurement Systems and Potential Reform Alternatives, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2005).
9
See The Gap Continues to Widen, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/
images/pdfs/gapgraph.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2012); see also The Need is Real, ORGAN
8

DONOR.GOV,

http://organdonor.gov/becomingdonor/index.htm (“Each day, about 79 people
receive organ transplants. However, 18 people die each day waiting for transplants that can't
take place because of the shortage of donated organs.”) (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
10 See Kevin B, O’Reilly, Kidney Foundation Plan Targets Financial Barriers to Donation,
amednews.com (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/02/23/prsb0223.htm;
Matt Cover, Obama Regulation Czar Advocated Removing People’s Organs Without Explicit
Consent, CNSNEWS (Sept. 3, 2009), http://www.cnsnews.com/print/53534.
11 See Cover, supra note 10.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 1.
14 See David Orentlicher, Presumed Consent to Organ Donation: Its Rise and Fall in the
United States, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 295, 298 (2009).
15 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 11.
16 See Grants & Research, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/dtcp/ (last
visited Mar. 6, 2011).
17 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 11; see also Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 85; see also
About
Us,
UNITED
NETWORK
FOR
ORGAN
SHARING
(UNOS),
http://www.unos.org/about/index.php (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); see also Awareness & Promo-
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by state law-makers has come by way of proposed “presumed consent” or “opt-out” organ donation laws.18 Such laws propose to flip
the current organ donation system in the United States, an opt-in system, on its head by rendering all persons de facto organ donors unless
they choose to expressly opt-out.19 The idea that presumed consent
laws can increase organ donation rates is based on the theory that
“more people ‘choose’ to be organ donors” when they must take affirmative steps to opt-out rather than opt-in.20 Further, in cases where
the decedent’s organ donor status is unknown, some propose that presumed consent laws can help to address the issue of family consent by
changing the dynamics of the interaction between doctors and family
members.21 “‘The next of kin can be approached quite differently
when the decedent’s silence is presumed to indicate a decision to donate rather than when it is presumed to indicate a decision not to donate. This shift may make it easier for the family to accept organ donation.’”22
While it is commendable that the states have taken the lead in
addressing the organ crisis, and while law-makers undoubtedly have
the best interests of their citizens in mind, opt-out organ donation
laws raise serious legal, ethical, and policy concerns that cannot be
overlooked.23 Can it be that the only solution to the organ shortage
crisis is one which poses a serious threat to our individual liberty, autonomy, and privacy? Are Americans willing to sacrifice such cherished values for the benefit of the common good? And even if the
answers to these questions are yes, will opt-out organ donation laws
withstand the constitutional challenges that are sure to come?
This Comment explores the policy implications and constitutionality of the recent state proposals for presumed consent organ donation laws. Part II offers an overview of the current opt-in organ dona-

tion,
Donation
&
Transplantation,
UNOS,
http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=awareness (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
18 See Madison Park, California, New York Mull Changes to Organ Donor Laws, CNN
HEALTH, May 10, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-05-10/health/organ.donation.jobs.laws_
1_kidney-transplants-organ-transplants-donor-registry?_s=PM:HEALTH.
19 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 18, 20; see also Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 295; see also
Catherine Rampell, How Can Countries Encourage Organ Donation? , N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 22,
2009, 2:12 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/how-can-we-encourage-organdonation/; see also Cover, supra note 10.
20 Cover, supra note 10, at 2 (“[I]n a 2003 study only 42 percent of people actively chose to
be organ donors, while only 18 percent actively opted out when their consent was presumed.”).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. (“‘Another [problem] is that [presumed consent laws are] a hard sell politically. . . .
More than a few people object to the idea of ‘presuming’ anything when it comes to such a
sensitive matter.’”).
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tion system in the United States. Part III examines the history of optout organ donation laws in the United States, the recent state proposals, and presumed consent systems around the world. Part IV discusses some of the policy implications of presumed consent for the
United States. Finally, the constitutional implications of presumed
consent are examined in Part V.
II. THE CURRENT OPT-IN SYSTEM
A. Living Donation
Living organ donation occurs when an organ is procured from a
24
living donor and transplanted into an organ recipient. This differs
from cadaveric organ donation where the organ donor has been de25
clared legally dead. There are five types of living donor transplants
performed in the United States: kidney (entire organ), liver (segment), lung (lobe), intestine (portion), and pancreas (portion).26 Although living organ donation is a vital part of the organ procurement
system in the United States, it will not be discussed further in this
Comment since presumed consent laws pertain only to cadaveric organ donation.
B.

Cadaveric Donation
1. History

The current cadaveric organ procurement system in the United
States first began to take shape with the passage of the 1968 Uniform
27
Anatomical Gift Act (1968 UAGA). Besides setting forth the first
comprehensive legislation dealing with organ transplantation, the
primary goal of the 1968 UAGA was to harmonize the various state
organ donation laws that had already come into effect.28 The 1968
UAGA addressed such issues as who may donate an organ and how a
29
person’s desire to donate should be documented. In 1977, the first
computerized donor-donee matching system, the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS), was established by the South-Eastern Organ
24 See
Living
Donation,
Information
You
Need
to
Know,
UNOS,
http://www.unos.org/docs/
Living_Donation.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
25 See Common Myths, Fact Sheets, Patient Education, Donation & Transplantation,
UNOS, http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_7 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
26 See Living Donation, Information You Need to Know, supra note 24.
27 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 10.
28 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 75-76.
29 See id. at 75-78.

2011]

No Means No, But Silence Means Yes?

153

Procurement Foundation.30 Although charged with many duties, the
primary task of UNOS was, and continues to be, the matching of do31
nors and candidates. Two subsequent pieces of legislation addressed
two critical issues that the 1968 UAGA neglected to address: (1) the
sale of human organs and (2) the determination of death for the purposes of cadaveric organ donation.32 In 1980, the National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA) provided that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any
person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”33 The NOTA also
called for the establishment of an Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN).34 Then, in 1984, the Uniform Determination
of Death Act (UDDA) codified the preexisting common law definition of death as “‘an individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of all functions of circulatory and respiratory function or
(2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem . . . .’”35
In 1987, the progression of science and technology in the field of
organ transplantation, as well as an increased need for cadaveric organ donation, necessitated a revised version of the UAGA.36 The
1987 UAGA featured some much needed improvements, such as the
simplification of the process by which one could designate himself or
37
herself a cadaveric donor. This simplification enabled states to begin
utilizing the present method of recording a person’s desired donor
status on identification cards, such as driver’s licenses.38 Further, the
1987 UAGA required hospitals to designate specific personnel to
conduct “routine inquiries” as to patients’ donor wishes and “required
requests” of next of kin for an anatomical gift from a decedent.39 In
addition, the 1987 UAGA incorporated NOTA’s prohibition on the
40
sale of human organs. Most significant, however, is the fact that the
30
31
32
33

See Watkins, supra note 8, at 11.
See id.; About Us, supra note 17.
See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 79.

42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2010).
See 42 U.S.C. § 274. UNOS has run the OPTN since its inception in 1986. See History,
Donation & Transplantation, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?topic=history
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
35 The New York Academy of Medicine, Statement and Resolution on the Definition of
Death (Nov. 1984), http:// www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1911797/pdf/bullnyacadmed
00075-0103.pdf (quoting the Uniform Determination of Death Act).
36 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 81.
37 See id. at 82.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 82-83.
34
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41
1987 UAGA contained a limited presumed consent provision. Under the 1987 UAGA, a medical examiner or coroner could authorize
the removal of any needed donor organ or tissue from a decedent in
the absence of any knowledge that a decedent or a decedent’s next of
kin objected to such removal.42 Although the 1987 UAGA provision
presented the first national experiment with limited scope presumed
consent laws, it is noteworthy that many states, as early as the 1960s,
had enacted limited scope presumed consent laws in an effort to in43
crease cadaveric organ donation. These early statutes were most
often restricted to cornea or pituitary gland removal, and nearly all
were limited in their application to cadavers in the custody of medical
examiners or coroners.44 These precursor state presumed consent
laws will be discussed in more detail infra at Section III.A. However, by 2006, when the UAGA was revised, yet again, a number of lawsuits involving the once popular state presumed consent laws resulted
in the elimination of the presumed consent provisions from the 2006
UAGA.45 Ultimately, most states followed suit and eliminated their
presumed consent laws by either adopting the 2006 UAGA or repeal46
ing their individual presumed consent statutes.

2. How the Current Opt-In System Works
a. Becoming a Donor – Providing Consent
The current opt-in system in the United States requires potential
donors or their next of kin to opt-in or provide explicit consent to or47
gan donation. Thus, absent such explicit consent, it is presumed that
a decedent did not wish to be an organ donor, or opted-out. Potential
donors can document their explicit consent by (1) registering with
their state donor registry, (2) designating their donor status on a driver’s license, (3) signing and carrying a donor card, and (4) informing
48
their family about their decision to be an organ donor. Although
often overlooked, family awareness is an important aspect of ensuring

41

See id. at 82.
See id.; Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 300.
43 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 299, 302.
44 See id. at 302-03.
45 See id. at 300, 305-08.
46 See id. at 300-01.
47 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 14; Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 74; Orentlicher, supra
note 14, at 298-99; Jacob M. Appel, Scavenging for Organs: Why the Donor Famine Justifies a
HUFFINGTON
POST,
(Mar.
15,
2010,
02:09
PM),
Radical
Harvest,
42

http:/www.huffingtonpost.com/Jacob-m-appel/scavenging-for-organs-why_b_499479.html.
48 See Becoming a Donor, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/become.asp
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
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that one’s wishes to become an organ donor are carried out.49 Concerns about liability often prevent doctors from removing organs
without the consent of next of kin despite a decedent’s properly documented organ donor status.50
b. Becoming a Transplant Candidate – Registering as a Candidate
To be placed on the national waiting list for an organ transplant,
a person must first obtain a referral from a physician and be evaluated
by a hospital with a transplant center [hereinafter transplant hospi51
tal]. After evaluation, the hospital’s transplant team will determine
when and at what status code a person will be added to the national
waiting list.52 The status code indicates how urgent a person’s need is
for a particular organ transplant.53
c. Matching Donors and Candidates
There are several players involved in facilitating the matching
process that unites available donor organs with compatible transplant
candidates. Besides, of course, the donors and transplant candidates
themselves, organ procurement organizations (OPOs), transplant cen54
ters, and UNOS play pivotal roles. Using DonorNet, a centralized
Internet-based database created by UNOS, Organ Procurement Coordinators at OPOs communicate information regarding newly acquired donor organs to transplant hospitals with compatible trans55
plant candidates. Many different considerations are factored into
the compatibility determination, such as the age of the candidate, the
blood and tissue type of the candidate (otherwise known as histocompatibility), the urgency of the candidate’s need, the amount of time
the candidate has spent on the national waiting list, the geographic
distance between the donor organ and the candidate,56 the size of the

49 See id.; Organ Donor FAQs, How to Be a Donor, If I Register as a Donor Will My
Wishes Be Carried Out?, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/faqs.html (last visit-

ed Mar. 21, 2012).
50 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 4, at 84.
51

See Organ Donation: The Process, About Donation & Transplantation, ORGAN

DONOR.GOV,

http://www.organdonor.gov/about/transplantationprocess.html#process2
visited Aug. 3, 2012).
52
53
54

(last

See id.
See id.
See Organ Donation: The Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/

about/organdonationprocess. html#process1 (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
55 See Organ Allocation, Donation & Transplantation, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/
donation/index.php?topic=orga n_allocation (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
56 The length of time a donor organ remains viable for transplantation varies according the
specific type of organ being transplanted. Heart: 4-6 hours, Liver: 12-24 hours, Kidney: 48-72
hours, Heart-Lung: 4-6 hours, Lung: 4-6 hours. See id.
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57
donor organ in relation to the size of the candidate, and the type of
donor organ needed.58

d. A Hybrid System – Mandated Choice
The main point of difference for the varying types of organ procurement systems lies at the point of consent.59 However, the opt-in
and opt-out systems do share at least one common aspect – they both
entail the raising of a presumption based on a decedent’s failure to
affirmatively act. Accordingly, in an opt-in system, a decedent is presumed to have not consented to organ donation if s/he never opted-in.
Conversely, in an opt-out system, a decedent is presumed to have consented to organ donation if s/he never opted-out. However, there is
an organ procurement system that involves the raising of no presumptions whatsoever. This system is referred to as “mandated choice”
and is seen as a middle-ground in the debate over opt-in and opt-out
systems.60 Under a mandated choice system, individuals must explicitly choose to either opt-in or opt-out of organ donation.61 There is also
a “soft” version of the mandated choice system that allows individuals
to select a third option, which instructs doctors to ask the individual’s
next of kin for consent.62 Neither consent nor lack of consent is presumed in mandated choice, and thus, it is more palatable to those individuals who express discomfort with the presumption of consent (or
63
lack thereof). California recently passed legislation establishing a
mandated choice system after initial efforts to pass legislation estab-

57

A donor organ from a large adult would be too big for a small child. See Organ Dona-

tion: The Process, supra note 54.
58 See Organ Matching Process, Common Elements,

ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.
organdonor.gov/about/organmatching.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
59 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 14-20.
60 See Cover, supra note 10 (“‘Another [problem] is that [presumed consent] is a hard sell
politically. . . . [P]eople object to the idea of ‘presuming’ anything when it comes to such a sensitive matter. For these reasons, . . . the best choice architecture for organ donations is mandated
choice.’”).
61 See Carol J. Roberts, Presumed Consent for Organ Procurement—Does It Have a
Future in the U.S.? (Ethical-Legal Perspectives), 35 J. NEUROSCIENCE NURSING 107, 108-09
(Apr. 2003); Cover, supra note 10.
62 See Roberts, supra note 61; Appel, supra note 47.
63 See Cover, supra note 10 (“‘Another [problem] is that [presumed consent] is a hard sell
politically. . . . [P]eople object to the idea of ‘presuming’ anything when it comes to such a sensitive matter. For these reasons, . . . the best choice architecture for organ donations is mandated
choice.’”).
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lishing an opt-out system failed.64 Texas, Colorado, and Illinois have
also passed mandated choice laws.65
III. THE OPT-OUT SYSTEM
A. The History of Presumed Consent Laws in the United States
As discussed above in Section II, presumed consent laws are not
66
entirely new to the United States. Starting as early as the 1960’s,
various states implemented presumed consent laws in an effort to in67
crease organ donation. All of these statutes, with the exception of
68
one, were limited in application to cadavers in the custody of medical
examiners or coroners.69 The rationale behind allowing for presumed
consent in these contexts was that such decedents would already be
70
subjected to a major intrusion by way of an autopsy. In addition, the
majority of the early presumed consent laws only allowed for the removal of corneas and pituitary glands.71 The pro-presumed consent
stance of the 1987 UAGA further reinforced the trend in state presumed consent laws such that, at their peak, presumed consent laws
72
were in effect in more than two-thirds of the fifty states. It is important to note, however, that these early presumed consent laws
were of the “soft” variety, and as such, allowed for a family member
to object to the donation and thus override the presumption of con73
sent.
The success of the early presumed consent laws in the United
States seemed to largely depend on their acceptance by medical professionals.74 In those states where presumed consent laws were embraced by medical professionals, they enjoyed much success and

64 See Judd Kessler, Organ Donation Legislation in California , MARKET DESIGN, (Oct. 8,
2010, 05:19 AM), http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2010/10/organ-donation-legislationin.html.
65 See Thaler on Mandated Choice , MARKET DESIGN, (Sep. 27, 2009, 05:59 AM),
http://marketdesigner.blogspot.co m/2009/09/thaler-on-mandated-choice.html; see also Organ
Transplants, ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/organ-transplants-article (last visited Mar. 6,
2011).
66 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 302.
67 See id.
68 A California presumed consent statute was also applicable to hospital patients. See
Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 302.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 299-300.
71 See id. at 302-03.
72 See id. at 300.
73 See id. at 300, 310.
74 See id. at 303-04.
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achieved the desired results of increasing cadaveric organ donation.
However, presumed consent laws were less successful in other states
where medical professionals, wary of the controversial nature of the
laws or fearful of incurring liability, refused to harvest organs without
express consent from either a decedent or next of kin.76
The decline of presumed consent laws in the United States began
in the early 1990’s with a few high-profile legal challenges, discussed
in more detail in Section V.77 The decline continued over the course
of the next fifteen years with official recognition of presumed consent’s demise coming in 2006 with a revised UAGA noticeably lacking
the presumed consent provisions of the 1987 UAGA.78 Forty-five
states, in addition to the District of Columbia and the United States
79
Virgin Islands, have since enacted the 2006 UAGA. The majority of
those states have followed the 2006 UAGA’s rejection of presumed
80
A few
consent and have repealed their presumed consent laws.
states, however, have retained presumed consent for an unclaimed
decedent’s corneas.81 However, as the next section discusses, the
worsening organ shortage crisis has fueled a resurgence of interest on
the part of the states in alternative organ procurement systems – and
the opt-out system seems to have taken center stage in the debate.
B.

Recent State Proposals for Opt-Out Organ Donation Laws.

In the past year alone, four states, California, New York, Illinois,
and Colorado, have made serious attempts to pass comprehensive
presumed consent legislation in an effort to implement state-wide opt82
out organ donation systems. In California, constitutional concerns
forced Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger to abandon his push for a
state-wide opt-out system and instead settle for a mandated choice
system.83 If passed, the recently proposed presumed consent laws in

75
76
77
78

See id. at 303.
See id. at 303-04.
See id. at 305-08.
See id. at 307-08.

79 Pennsylvania is currently considering its enactment. See Anatomical Gift Act (2006),
Enactment Status Map, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical

Gift Act (2006) (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
80 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 308.
81 See id.
82 See Appel, supra note 47.
83 See Our View on End-of-Life Choices: States Overlook Easy Way to Raise Organ
Donation Rates, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-05-19-

editorial19_ST_N.htm (last updated May 18, 2010, 08:55 PM).
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New York, Illinois, and Colorado would implement the first opt-out
organ procurement systems in the nation.84
1. California
The impetus behind Governor Schwarzenegger’s brief foray into
presumed consent laws came from an unlikely source – Steve Jobs,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Apple, Inc.85 Mr. Jobs, a
liver transplant recipient himself, suggested the move to an opt-out
system after returning to California from a trip to Europe where he
86
saw the potential benefits of an opt-out system first-hand. With California having one of the lowest rates of organ donation in the country,87 Governor Schwarzenegger thought an opt-out system might be
88
the answer for California. However, the ensuing public outcry soon
prompted Governor Schwarzenegger to abandon the opt-out proposal
citing constitutional concerns.89 In the end, the bill that Governor
Schwarzenegger signed into effect on October 5, 2010 was a compro90
mise. Instead of an opt-out system, senate bill (SB) 1395 established
a mandated choice system in California.91 All driver’s license applicants in California will now be asked to choose whether they want to
be an organ donor (and thus be added to the state’s organ and tissue
92
donor registry). Previously, applicants had to volunteer this information in order to have their organ donor status reflected on a driv93
er’s license. Further, the bill established the first ever live donor registry for kidney transplants in the nation.94 SB 1395 provides in pertinent part:
[A]n application for an original or renewal driver’s license or
identification card shall contain a space for the applicant to enroll in the Donate Life California Organ and Tissue Donor Registry. The application shall include check boxes for an applicant
to mark either (A) Yes, add my name to the donor registry or
(B) I do not wish to register at this time. The department shall
84 See Appel, supra note 47; Park, supra note 18; Kathleen Gilbert, Illinois Considers
‘Presumed Consent’ Organ Harvesting Bill, LIFESITENEWS.COM (Mar. 4, 2010, 12:15 EST),
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/archive/ldn/201 0/mar/10030408.
85 See Park, supra note 18.
86 See Kessler, supra note 64.
87 See USA TODAY, supra note 83.
88 See Kessler, supra note 64.
89
90
91
92
93
94

See id.
See id.
See S.B. 1395, 2010 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 217 (Cal. 2010).
See id.
See id.
See id.
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inquire verbally of an applicant applying in person for an original
or renewal driver’s license or identification card at a department
office as to whether the applicant wishes to enroll in the Donate
95
Life California Organ and Tissue Donor Registry.
2. New York
On February 4, 2010, New York State Assemblyman Richard
Brodsky introduced bill number A09865 which “provides that indi96
viduals must opt[-]out of organ donation.” With regard to driver’s
license applicants, A09865 proposes in pertinent part:
[T]he commissioner also shall . . . provide space on the application so that the applicant may . . . OPT-OUT OF the New York
state organ and tissue donor registry . . . . IF THE APPLICANT
DOES NOT DECLINE TO BE REGISTERED IN THE NEW
YORK STATE ORGAN AND TISSUE DONOR REGISTRY
THEY WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY ENROLLED.97
The self-professed purpose of the bill is to “significantly increas[e] [New York’s organ donation rate] while taking into consideration all of the individual rights of persons to decline enrollment into
the program.” For justification, the bill points to the fact that New
York has the lowest organ donation rate in the country.98
3. Illinois
In February of 2010, Illinois Senator Dale Risinger introduced
99
bill 3613, the Presumed Donor bill. If passed, the bill will replace
Illinois’s current opt-in organ procurement system with one that is
opt-out.100 Like the California and New York presumed consent pro101
posals, the bill has already been met with opposition. The proposed
bill provides in pertinent part:

95
96

See id.
See

Bill
No.
A09865,
N.Y.
State
Assemb.,
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A09865&term=2009&Summary=Y&Actions=
Y&Votes=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
97

See id.
See id.; see also USA TODAY, supra note 83.
99 See Appel, supra note 47; see also Warner Todd Huston, Illinois Dangerous ‘Presumed
Consent’
Organ
Donor
Bill,
CANADA
FREE
PRESS
(Mar.
7,
2010),
http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/20753; see also Bill Text: IL Senate Bill 3613 98

96th General Assembly, ELOBBYIST, http://e-lobbyist.com/gaits/text/13009 (last visited Mar. 6,
2011).
100 See ELOBBYIST, supra note 99.
101

See id.
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[E]ach resident of Illinois who is of sound mind and who has attained the age of 18 years is presumed, by operation of law, to
have given all of his or her body for any purpose stated in section
5-10 [medical or dental education, research, advancement of
medical or dental science, therapy, or transplantation]. The gift
takes effect upon the individual’s death without the need to obtain the consent of any survivor. . . .an individual may . . . opt[]out . . . by filing with the Secretary of State[]. . .an organ donor
opt[-] out document. An individual who has filed [an organ donor opt-out] document shall be included in an Organ Donor Opt
Out Registry maintained by the Secretary of State.102
4. Colorado
In mid-January 2011, State Representative Dan Pabon introduced a presumed consent organ donation bill, SB 11-042, in the Col103
orado General Assembly. Perhaps Representative Pabon is hoping
that his donor-friendly state104 will be more receptive to the idea of
presumed consent than other states where similar proposals have
105
If passed, SB 11-042, entitled “A Bill Concerning
failed to pass.
Presumed Consent for Organ and Tissue Donation,” would
change[] [Colorado’s] organ donation program so that a person is
presumed to have consented to organ and tissue donation at the
time the person applies for or renews a driver’s license or [state]
identification card unless the person initials a statement that
states that the person does not want to be considered as a possible organ and tissue donor.106
The proposed text of the opt-out statement appears in the bill as
follows:
You are automatically deemed to have consented to being an organ and tissue donor and this designation will appear on your
driver’s license or identification card. If you do not want to be
102
103

See id.
See Daniel Sayani, Colorado Proposes “Presumed Consent” Organ Harvesting, THE

NEW AMERICAN (Jan. 24, 2011, 03:15 PM) http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.
php/usnews/politics/6012-colorado-proposes-presumed-consent-organ-harvesting.
104 See Dayle Cedars, Colorado May Make Organ Donation Approval Automatic ,
THEDENVERCHANNEL.COM (Jan. 19, 2011, 10:15 PM), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/
news/26540152/detail .html (“Nearly two-thirds of people carrying driver’s licenses or stateissued IDs volunteer as donors—a higher rate than in any other state.”).
105 See Cedars, supra note 104.
106 S.B. 11-042, 68th Gen. Assembly Reg. Sess. (Co. 2011), available at http://www.
leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2011a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/319B3F36D587959D872578010060499C?open&f
ile=042_01.pdf.
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considered an organ and tissue donor, you must elect to not be
included on the organ donor registry by inserting your initials on
the line below.
______ At this time, I do not wish to be included on the organ
donor registry.107
The bill further states that
[u]nless an applicant responds that he or she does not want to be
considered a possible organ and tissue donor, the applicant will
be deemed to have consented to organ and tissue donation. The
consent is sufficient to satisfy all requirements necessary to evidence the applicant’s consent to anatomical donation of the applicant’s organs and tissue.108
Colorado State Senator Lucia Guzman was initially supporting
the bill, but soon after its proposal, dropped her support.109 Thus, the
future of the bill is now uncertain.110 Nevertheless, SB 11-042 has
managed to create a lot of controversy in a relatively short amount of
111
time.
C.

Opt-Out Systems Around the World

There are several countries around the world that utilize opt-out
112
organ procurement systems, some more successfully than others.
Spain, Austria, France, Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Sweden are
among some of the countries that have adopted presumed consent
organ donation laws.113 Austria utilizes a “hard” opt-out system, in
which the consent of next of kin is not required prior to removing or114
gans from a decedent who did not previously opt-out. Spain utilizes
a “soft” opt-out system, in which next of kin are given the opportunity

107

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4.
109 See Sayani, supra note 103, at 1.
110 See id. at 3.
111 See Sayani, supra note 103; Tammy Vigil, Trip to DMV Could Make You an Automatic
Organ Donor, If State Bill Passes, KDVR.COM (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.ky3.com/kdvr-state108

bill-would-make-you-an-organ-donor-automatically-20110119,0,3821743.story; Jessica Hyduke,

Organ Donation: Opt-In System Should Become Opt-Out, STATEPRESS.COM (Jan. 27, 2011,
08:06 PM), http://www.statepress.com/2011/01/27/organ-donation-opt-in-system-should-becomeopt-out/; Wesley J. Smith, Colorado: Say No to “Presumed Consent” Organ Conscription, FIRST
THINGS
(Jan.
20,
2011),
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/secondhandsmoke/2011/01/20/colorado-say-no-to-presumedconsent-organ-conscription/.
112 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 2, 3.
113 Id. at 3.
114 See id. at 22.
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to object to organ donation, even if the decedent did not previously
opt-out.115 In some countries, such as France, “hard” systems are effectively rendered “soft” by physicians that are hesitant to remove a
116
decedent’s organs without the consent of next of kin. In a 2008 international comparison of organ donation rates, all of these countries
were ranked in the top twenty, with Spain leading the way with a rate
of 34.2 organ donors per million.117 Indeed, many countries that have
implemented presumed consent donation systems have seen drastic
118
increases in their organ donation rates.
However, whether the presumed consent laws of these countries
are single-handedly responsible for their higher procurement rates is a
subject of much debate.119 For instance, some commentators argue
that although Spain’s presumed consent laws have been in effect for
several decades, they are, for the most part, inactive.120 They point to
Spain’s lack of spending on public awareness of its presumed consent
legislation, and the fact that Spain does not have an opt-out registry
for recording the objections of those who do not wish to become or121
Instead, these commentators posit other theories for
gan donors.
Spain’s success.122 Some theorize that Spain’s high organ donation
rate is partly attributable to the larger numbers of healthy individuals
123
Others, including Dr. Rafael
killed there in automobile accidents.
Matesanz, the director of Organizacion Nacional de Trasplantes, the
organization that manages Spain’s organ donation system, attribute
Spain’s success in increasing organ donation rates to its investment in
115
116

See id. at 20.
See id.

117 Marti Manyalich et al., 2008 International Donation and Transplantation Activity ,
EUROPEAN TRANSPLANT COORDINATORS (last updated Oct. 11, 2009), http://www.european
transplantcoordinators.org/uploads/pdfs/Irodat/03Irodat%202008.pdf.
118 Since Spain adopted a presumed consent organ donation system in 1990, its donation
rates have nearly doubled. After adopting a system of presumed consent in 1982, Vienna saw its
organ donation rates quadruple, “and by 1990 the number of kidney transplants performed was
nearly equal to those on the waiting list.” Everyone ‘Should Donate Organs,’ BBC NEWS (Jul.
17, 2007, 18:45:32 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/health/6902519.stm.
119 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 20; see also Kieran Healy, Do Presumed-Consent Laws
Raise Organ Procurement Rates?, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 1017, 1043 (Spring 2006) (“As best we can
tell, countries with high procurement rates do not owe their success to any . . . legal conception
of consent. . . . Rather, more fine-grained organizational differences –specifically in logistics and
process management – are responsible for their success.”); see also Statistics-International Donor Statistics, TRANSPLANT.ORG.AU., http://www.transplant.org.au/Statistic_s.html (last visited
Mar. 6, 2011).
120 See Jennifer Trueland, Presumed Consent May Not Increase Organ Donation – Study,
CALEDONIAN MERCURY (Oct. 19, 2010), http://health.caledonianmercury.com/2010/10/19/
presumed-consent-may-not-increase-organ-donation-study/00939.
121
122
123

See id.
See id.
See Everyone ‘Should Donate Organs,’ supra note 118.
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124
the infrastructure of its organ procurement system. Thus, it may be
that presumed consent laws do not provide the easy fix that many
hope they will.

IV. THE POLICY & ETHICS OF PRESUMED CONSENT ORGAN
DONATION
Ask any American what core moral and ethical values underlie
American society, and you are sure to hear back words such as indi125
After all, these
vidualism, beneficence, altruism, and autonomy.
values form the bedrock of the “most American” of American institutions: democracy and capitalism. Americans champion these values
and look to their government and courts to defend and reinforce
them. It is no wonder then that the most emphatic objections against
the adoption of presumed consent systems in the United States stem
from these most sacred of principles.126
A. Of Liberty, Autonomy, and Privacy
As Americans, perhaps there is no area where we value our liberty, autonomy, and privacy more than in the realm of “freedom of
choice.”127 We take pride in the fact that our country affords us more
freedom of choice than perhaps any other country in the world. From
what type of cereal to grab off the shelf in the dizzying grocery store
cereal aisle, to which politician to vote for when we step inside the
voting booth, to whether to remain silent or confess – when it comes
to personal decision-making, there is nothing more American than
liberty and autonomy; regardless of whether we like the choices we
are presented with at any given time, we take comfort in knowing that
we at least have a choice, while others do not.
In fact, the paramount importance that Americans put on privacy
and autonomy when exercising their freedom of choice is no better
evidenced than by the numerous United States Supreme Court opinions in recent decades that have constitutionalized privacy within the

124 In 1989, Spain overhauled its organ procurement system, bringing in intensive-care
doctors and nurses to serve as transplant coordinators, establishing 24-hour organ retrieval
teams at hospitals, and improving training for doctors who talk to grieving families. See
Rampell, supra note 19; see also Vidya Ram, Solving the Organ Crisis, The Spanish Way,
FORBES.COM (Sep. 2, 2009, 6:00 PM EDT), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/02/public-privatehealthcare-business-healthcare-organ-donation.html (“Having intensive-care doctors is key. . .
.Spain[’s organ procurement system] currently has 198 doctors and 150 nurses in 174 hospitals
across the country.”); see Trueland, supra note 120.
125 See Roberts, supra note 61 at 111.
126 See id.
127 See id. at 112.

2011]

No Means No, But Silence Means Yes?

165

context of American personal decision-making.128
Accordingly,
Americans have come to expect that, without their affirmative consent, this sphere of privacy cannot be invaded by the government (except for certain compelling reasons). Although controversial at times,
the current opt-in organ donation system in the United States is still
generally acceptable precisely because it is consistent with these principles. No one in this country is an organ donor unless s/he affirmatively chooses to be one;129 the decision to be an organ donor is an autonomous one – the government and/or medical professionals do not
enter the decision-making process until after the decision has been
made.
On the other hand, to most Americans, an opt-out or presumed
consent system of organ donation flies directly in the face of these
values. Under a presumed consent system, government intrusion into
the personal decision of organ donation is the default, rather than a
consented-to transgression.130 Such unbridled government intrusion
into a personal decision concerning death and the sanctity of one’s
own body would undoubtedly be met with much opposition – as already demonstrated by the California and New York attempts to establish state-wide presumed consent organ donation systems.
A mandated choice system, discussed in Section II.B.2.d., may in
fact provide the best compromise between addressing America’s organ
crisis and preserving individuals’ autonomy in making the decision
whether to become an organ donor.131 Moreover, the increased public
awareness that would result from a mandated choice system may help
to spur further evolution in America’s organ donation policy.132

128 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (“This Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965) (“Various guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy.”); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear . . . a child.”); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (“Under our Constitution, the freedom [of choice] to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572, 574 (2003) (“[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives. . . . [O]ur laws and tradition afford constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”).
129 With the exception of the few “John Doe” state laws that still remain on the books;
these are discussed in Section III.A., supra.
130 See Watkins, supra note 8, at 9.
131 See Roberts, supra note 61 at 108-09.
132 See id. at 109.
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1. Requiring an Affirmative Act and Altruism
It goes without saying that part of freedom of choice is choosing
not to act. In fact, in the interest of individual liberty and autonomy,
both tort and criminal common law caution against legally obligating
133
Instead, laws in our
individuals to act for the benefit of others.
country traditionally require only that individuals act in ways that do
134
not result in harm to others. Nevertheless, many proponents of presumed consent laws contend that their imposition on personal auton135
omy is justified by virtue of the moral good of saving lives. According to this argument, a presumed consent system presumes that most
people “wish to do the morally right thing.”136 Thus, from an ethical
perspective, presumed consent laws impose what is called passive altruism; they obligate people to act for the benefit of others (unless
they register an affirmative objection).137 However, as noted above,
legislating altruism is not a part of the American legal tradition. Instead, American society has come to endorse a policy of active altruism, whereby an individual affirmatively chooses whether to act for
138
the benefit of others. Such is the case with the current opt-in organ
donation system in the United States, which relies on the active altruism of organ donors and their families for its survival.
Along the same lines, perception plays a big part in Americans’
acceptance of laws and policies that challenge these notions.139 For
many Americans, the individual rights surrounding the most fundamental aspects of their personal lives and bodies are only theirs to
forfeit or “give away.” Accordingly, laws and policies that are consistent with the notion of active altruism, such as explicit consent organ donation laws, are most palatable to the American public. As
evidenced by the term “donor,” the act of organ procurement under
explicit consent organ donation laws is perceived as an act of “giving”,
with the individual affirmatively choosing to waive certain individual
rights for the benefit of another.140 Conversely, under presumed consent organ donation laws, the act of organ procurement is more likely
to be perceived as an act of “taking” – with the government intruding
upon the rights of the individual without consent.141 This perception

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

See Restatement (Second) of Torts, div. 2, ch. 12, topic 7, § 314 (1965).
See id.
See Roberts, supra note 61 at 111.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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may very well be the fatal flaw that makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for presumed consent laws to gain wide acceptance by the
American public.
2. The Legal Fiction of Presumed Consent
In law, a presumption is best described as “[a] conclusion made
as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact that [is] drawn from other
142
There are two
evidence that is admitted and proven to be true.”
types of legal presumptions: rebuttable and irrebuttable.143 Within the
context of evidence law, however, the vast majority of presumptions
are rebuttable, meaning the presumed fact can be negated by the offering of sufficient evidence.144 It is on this point that the concept of
presumed consent reveals itself as a legal fiction.
Under the usual operating procedures of a true legal presumption, the donor should have the opportunity to rebut or negate the
145
presumption of consent. Under a presumed consent system, however, the presumption of consent does not arise until a person is deceased. Put in terms of the above definition, death and the failure to
opt-out are the sole evidentiary facts that must be proven to lead to
the conclusion of the existence of consent. So, when does the presumed donor have the opportunity to rebut or negate the presumption of consent? The answer here is obviously never, since the donor
146
is deceased and can no longer raise any objections.
One could argue that the presumed donor has at least one, and
possibly two, chances to rebut or negate the presumption: prior to
death by opting-out and after death by the objection of next of kin.
The first argument fails, however, because as noted above, the presumption does not arise until the person is deceased. Opting-out before death is an affirmative expression by the individual that s/he does
not wish to be an organ donor. As such, opting-out merely prevents
the presumption from arising in the first place; it does not operate to
rebut or negate it. The second argument, although stronger, is also
problematic. First, the objection of next of kin only comes into play in
a “soft” presumed consent system.147 As discussed in Section III.C., in
142 Legal
Dictionary,
THE
FREE
DICTIONARY,
http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
presumption (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
143 See PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 55-56 (3d ed. 2009).
144 See id. at 55.
145 See id.
146 See Barbara K. Pierscionek, What is Presumed When We Presume Consent? , BMC
MEDICAL ETHICS, Apr. 25, 2008, at 2 available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/
pdf/1472-6939-9-8.pdf.
147 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 300, 310.
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a “hard” presumed consent system, the consent of next of kin is nei148
Second, assuming a “soft” system, in
ther sought nor considered.
order to register an objection on behalf of the deceased, the next of
kin would have to (1) be aware of the state presumed consent statutes
and (2) be able to register the objection within a relatively short
amount of time after the death of the decedent. Unfortunately, the
chance of both of these conditions being satisfied concurrently is slim
at best. When states have presumed consent laws, the evidence shows
149
that people are generally unaware that the statutes exist. Further,
because organs and tissues must be harvested soon after death to ensure their viability, the window of opportunity for registering an objection is brief.150 Moreover, even if these conditions are satisfied, unless the decedent’s organ donor status has been explicitly provided for
in a will or similar document, the possibility remains that the next of
kin will provide consent contrary to the wishes of the decedent.
So, what is being presumed when one presumes consent to organ
donation?151 In theory, one is making a presumption of donor willing152
In reality, however, presumed consent laws place the state’s
ness.
interest in saving lives above the individual’s interest in autonomy,153
and thus, the presumption being made is that “of state rights to post154
mortem body organs.” Accordingly, some have proposed that the
phrase “presumed consent” is a misnomer that should be replaced by
the phrase “specified refusal” in order to place emphasis on the action
(i.e., opting-out) that is required of the individual in presumed consent systems.155
3. Organ Donation as a Private Choice
As discussed in section V. infra, the gradual constitutionalization
of individual privacy by the United States Supreme Court means that
each of us, as citizens, has come to expect that we will be free of government interference when it comes to making certain personal decisions concerning life and death. Of course, the right of privacy and
148

See Watkins, supra note 8, at 21.
See Michele Goodwin, Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking, Racial
Profiling & Distributive Justice, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ ¶ 22, 26, 35-36, n.120 (Spring 2001).
150 See id. at 37; Carrie Parsons O’Keeffe, Note, When An Anatomical “Gift” Isn’t a Gift:
Presumed Consent Laws as an Affront to Religious Liberty, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 287, 293
149

(Fall 2002).
151
152
153

See Pierscionek, supra note 146.
See id.
See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶ 18 (“[P]resumed consent proponents argue that

saving the living should be society’s greatest concern . . . .”).
154 See Pierscionek, supra note 146, at 2.
155

See id.
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personal liberty grounded by the Court in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is not absolute.156 Like all fundamental
rights recognized by the Court, the government can curtail the right of
157
privacy in furtherance of a compelling interest.
Organ donation is most certainly one area of personal decisionmaking in which Americans do not expect to run into government
interference. And unlike other modern, controversial privacy issues,
such as abortion and assisted suicide, most people seem to agree that
the government should not have a say in whether a person chooses to
donate his/her organs. Of course, this sense of universal agreement
could merely be a reflection of the fact that proposals calling for increased government involvement in cadaveric organ donation are relatively recent and have escaped wide-spread public scrutiny, at least
on a national scale.158 However, a consideration of the values at play
in each of these areas reveals that there is a more likely explanation
for the congruence than lack of public awareness. In both the abortion and assisted suicide contexts, many Americans accept, and even
condone, government intrusion into such decisions to prevent intentional harm to a human life.159 Besides being an underlying theme of
most major religions, “do no harm” is a principle underlying tort and
criminal common law. Moreover, in the Court’s view, it is the prevention of intentional harm to a human life what furnishes the compelling
interest necessary to justify government intrusion into these areas.160
In contrast, few Americans would argue that the decision not to
donate one’s organs is equivalent to an intentional act of harm towards another individual. Rather, most would view such a decision as
an act of self-preservation, with any incidental third-party harm being
indirect at best.161 Further, while many would argue that saving the
lives of those individuals waiting for organ transplants is a compelling

156
157

See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154, 155 (1973).
See id. at 155.

158 Notably, the recent attempts to implement state-wide presumed consent organ donation
systems have received relatively little national attention. Rather, a quick internet search reveals
that, in each case, the public reaction and media coverage appears to be fairly localized.
159 See Lydia Saad, Four Moral Issues Sharply Divide Americans, GALLUP (May 26, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/137357/four-moral-issues-sharply-divide-americans.aspx; see also
Lydia Saad, The New Normal on Abortion: Americans More “ProLife,” Underlying Moral
Reaction
to
Abortion
is
Unchanged,
GALLUP
(May
14,
2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/128036/new-normal-abortion-americans-pro-life.aspx; Lydia Saad,
More Americans “ProLife” Than “Pro-Choice” for First Time, GALLUP (May 15, 2009),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/118399/more-americans-pro-life-than-pro-choice-first-time.aspx.
160 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
161 Of course, self-preservation can also be an argument in favor of abortion. However, in
such cases, self preservation can only be accomplished at the cost of inflicting harm to another
human life.
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government interest, the question remains whether it is compelling
enough to justify government intrusion into such a personal and private decision. Absent the moral underpinnings present within the
contexts of abortion and assisted suicide, the answer here would appear to be “no.” Moreover, one would assume that, to require individuals to affirmatively act for the benefit of others, the nature and
degree of the compelling interest at play would have to rise above and
beyond those compelling interests which justify government intrusion
into the abortion and assisted suicide contexts. Such is not the case
here, and thus presumed consent laws will not likely pass the muster
of today’s privacy jurisprudence.
B.

Where is the Social Justice?
Socioeconomics and Disparate Impact

Presumed consent organ donation laws are also problematic from
162
a social justice perspective. Past experiences with presumed consent
laws have shown that racial, cultural, and socioeconomic factors inevitably lead to their disparate impact on marginalized groups, such as
the poor, uneducated, and minorities.163 For example, in those states
that had presumed consent laws prior to their widespread eradication
with the promulgation of the 2006 UAGA, implementation was
placed primarily in the hands of coroners and medical examiners.164
As a result, a disproportionate number of presumed consent organ
and tissue donations under these laws came from donors who had met
violent deaths165 or could not be identified – groups traditionally comprised of minorities and the poor.166 This disparity seems all the more
unfair when one considers that members of such groups are also the
167
least likely to be recipients of a donor organ.
Even if one imagines a better future for presumed consent laws –
one in which such disparities are eliminated by a more standardized
and widespread implementation scheme – the fact remains that those
people who are uneducated and/or ignorant about the law will be dis162

See Goodwin, supra note 149.
See id. at ¶ 44.
164 See id. at ¶ 22.
165 See id. (Violent deaths, such as “homicides, trauma, and poisonings, . . . [occur] disproportionately in urban and poor communities”); Id. at ¶ 44 (As a result, presumed consent laws,
163

as applied, disproportionately affect minorities, such as blacks and latinos, who are “more likely
to die by violent deaths than whites . . . .”); Id. at ¶ 45. (“In a Los Angeles study . . . over eighty
percent of those autopsied (and who became involuntary tissue donors)[] were black and latino.
Only sixteen percent were white.”).
166 See id. at ¶¶ 43-46.
167 See id. at ¶ 43.
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advantaged in a system that requires prospective awareness and comprehension of the law in order to effectively opt-out. Thus, although
168
presumed consent laws are often justified as good for the whole,
they are anything but equitable, and are more likely to end up benefiting some to the detriment of others.169
C.

Medical Ethics Concerns

Of the numerous bioethical concerns raised by presumed consent
laws, perhaps the two most significant, from the perspective of the
modern medical establishment, are the lack of explicit informed consent170 and the risks posed by procuring organs and tissues from donors with unknown social histories.171
The modern-day requirement of explicit informed consent as a
condition precedent to medical treatment and research is an important one.172 Nothing better illustrates this point than its historical
roots. In particular, two atrocities of the twentieth century are responsible for the mandate of explicit informed consent – the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study173 and the Holocaust.174 Both events revealed modern

168
169
170

See id. at ¶ 49.
See id. ¶¶ 51-52.
See Pierscionek, supra note 146, at 2 (“[C]onsent to medical treatment and/or study on

any part of the body must always be sought.”).
171 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶¶ 39-42.
172 See OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,
REGULATIONS AND ETHICAL GUIDELINES, PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS (June 23, 2005),
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/45cfr46.html (“Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in research covered by this policy unless the
investigator has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's
legally authorized representative.”).
173 The Tuskegee Syphilis Study was a 40-year study, spanning 1932-1972, that involved six
hundred black men from Macon County, Alabama, a predominantly poor, rural area. See U.S.
Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee , CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/
timeline.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2012); Inside the National Archives, Southeast Region: 6. The
Tuskegee Study, NATIONALARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/southeast/exhibit/6.php. The
study was conducted to follow the natural progression of syphilis in blacks, with the hopes of
justifying black treatment programs. See id. Three hundred and ninety nine of the men had
syphilis, the other two hundred and one did not. See id. Although the men agreed to be in the
study, none of them provided “informed” consent as the term is used today – the men were not
informed of the real purpose for the study and in fact, none of the three hundred and ninety nine
men who had syphilis were informed of this fact or were treated for it, even after the emergence,
in 1947, of penicillin as the standard treatment for the disease. See id. For taking part in the
study, the men received “free medical exams, free meals, and burial insurance.” Id. Only in
1972, after the publication of an associated press story about the study, did public outcry lead to
the termination of the study. See id. By that time, numerous study participants had died from
syphilis and related complications. See Remembering Tuskegee, NPR.ORG (July 25, 2002),
http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2002/jul/ tuskegee/. Moreover, many had passed
the disease on to their wives and children. See id.
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medicine’s potential for abuse, especially with respect to those who
175
are marginalized in society. The subsequent outcries for better protections of human subjects of treatment and/or research eventually led
to the regulations mandating the use and documentation of explicit
informed consent in such activities today.176
Some in the medical community also express concern about the
“quality” of tissues and organs procured by way of presumed consent.177 They point to the lax health requirements for presumed consent donors and the fact that presumed consent statutes typically “do
178
not mandate that [the] social histories [of donors] be obtained.”
These shortfalls, combined with the “lifestyles of some [likely] presumed consent donors,”179 can lead to the transmission of communicable diseases from donor to recipient.180 Obviously, such an outcome
would be contrary to the paramount justification for organ donation
and transplantation – that of saving a life. Thus, both the lack of explicit informed consent and the potentially subpar quality of tissues
and organs procured by way of presumed consent present significant
medical ethics barriers to the widespread implementation of presumed consent laws in the United States.
D. Religious Liberty
The question of whether organ donation is objectionable on religious grounds seems simple enough, but the answer apparently is not.
Depending on which source you reference, you get one of three an181
swers: (1) all/most major religions approve of organ donation, (2)
182
some religions flat out prohibit organ donation, and (3) some reli174 It is well-known that during the Holocaust, concentration camp prisoners were subjected to medical research experiments against their will. For more information and photographs,
see Holocaust Encyclopedia, Nazi Medical Experiments, THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL
MUSEUM,
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?
ModuleId
=10005168 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); see also Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶ 37.
175 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶ 37.
176 See OFFICE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, supra note 172.
177 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶¶ 39-42.
178 Id. at ¶ 39.
179 See supra Section IV.B.
180 See Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶¶ 39, 41.
181 See
Common Myths of Organ Donation, UNOS, http://www.unos.org/
donation/index.php?topic=fact_sheet_7 (last visited Aug. 15, 2012); Mayo Clinic Staff, Consum-

er

Health,

In-Depth,

Organ

Donation:

Don’t

Let

These

Myths

Confuse

You,

MAYOCLINIC.COM, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/organ-donation/FL00077 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2011); Understanding Donation, Learn the Facts, DONATELIFE.NET,
http://donatelife.net/Understanding
Donation/LearnTheFacts.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
182 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292 (“In the Middle East, religious precepts discourage
and in some places prohibit cadaveric organ donation.”) (quoting the Bellagio Task Force Re-
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gions that traditionally objected to organ donation now approve of it
as “an act of charity.” 183 Even this seems like an oversimplification,
184
Further
however, since some religions remain split on the issue.
complicating the issue is the fact that most people’s religious beliefs
are highly influenced by their cultural and moral beliefs as well.185
Simply put – religion is personal. Thus, within a given religion, you
may find some individuals who object to organ donation and others
who do not.186
Confusion aside, it is clear that for some people, objections to cadaveric organ donation are grounded in their religious beliefs and
traditions. For such people, presumed consent laws are a direct affront to religious liberty because they “burden[] . . . free exercise of
religion by precluding quintessentially religious burial rites.”187
The case of You Vang Yang v. Sturner188 is illustrative here. The
Yangs, who lived in Rhode Island, were members of the Hmong reli189
The Hmong religion “prohibits any mutilation of the body,
gion.
including autopsies or the removal of organs during an autopsy.”190
When the Yangs’ twenty-three year-old son unexpectedly died at a
Rhode Island hospital, his body, pursuant to a state statute, was transferred to the state medical examiners’ office for investigation into his
191
unexplained death. The chief medical examiner then proceeded to
perform an autopsy on the Yangs’ son without their knowledge or

port on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the International Traffic in Organs). The two
main religious objections to cadaveric organ donation involve the concepts of brain death and
bodily integrity. See id. at 292-93. For instance, many religions do not recognize brain death as
the sole indicator of death. Id. Thus, “for followers of these traditions, extraction of organs
from a “brain dead” individual [whose heart and lungs are still functioning] constitutes live
dismemberment or murder.” Id. at 292. Moreover, many religions view death holistically, involving both the body and the soul. Id. at 292. Accordingly, for such religions, it is often paramount that the integrity of the body be maintained for burial. Id.
183 See id. at 292; see also UNOS, supra note 181; DONATELIFE.NET, supra note 181.
184 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292 (“[A]lthough many religious leaders have sanctioned organ donation as a gift of life, others continue to object to the practice.”).
185 See Allison Pond, Myths About Religion and Organ Donation Create Hesitation ,
DESERET NEWS, Aug. 5, 2011, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700168701/Myths-aboutreligion-and-organ-donation-cause-hesitation.html?pg=all (last visited Aug. 15, 2012),
186 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292-93 (“‘[S]ome Orthodox Jewish rabbis sanction
cadaveric donation . . . . However, others reject the principle of brain death (equating it with
murder), thereby making organ retrieval almost impossible.”) (quoting Bellagio Task Force
Report on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the International Traffic in Human Organs).
187 See id. at 289.
188 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990) (Yang I), opinion withdrawn by You Vang Yang v.
Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (Yang II).
189 See Yang I, 728 F. Supp. at 846; Goodwin, supra note 149, at ¶ 38.
190 Yang I, 728 F. Supp. at 846.
191

See id.
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192
The Yangs subsequently brought suit against the chief
consent.
medical examiner claiming that, among other things, the state statute
that compelled their son’s autopsy violated their First Amendment
right to the free exercise of their religion.193 Under the thenapplicable strict scrutiny standard of review,194 the district court ruled
195
in favor of the Yangs on their First Amendment claim. The Yangs’
triumph was short-lived, however, as the district court was forced to
withdraw its initial opinion in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in

Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith,196 which held that “generally-applicable, religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest . . . .”197 The
Smith decision was not received well by Congress, however, and in
1993, Congress attempted to undue its effect and re-implement the
strict scrutiny standard of review for free exercise challenges by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).198 Federalism
concerns subsequently prompted the Supreme Court to hold the
RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v.
Flores.199 Significantly, however, Flores did not prevent the states
from enacting their own state versions of the RFRA. Indeed, as of
200
2002, eleven states have done so.
The point of this discussion is two-fold: (1) the Yang case serves
as a sobering example of the dangers presumed consent laws could
pose to the religious liberties of those who object to cadaveric organ
donation;201 and (2) because several states have enacted their own
RFRA’s, free exercise challenges to state presumed consent laws are
not only viable, but likely.

192
193
194
195
196

See id.
See id. at 847.
See id. at 855-56.
See id. at 857.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
You Vang Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 559 (D.R.I. 1990) (Yang II) (quoting
Smith, 494 U.S. at 1604 n.3).
198 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (Supp. V 1993).
199 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See also O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 303 (“[The RFRA] continues
to apply to the federal government.”).
200 See id. at 303.
201 Although the dispute in Yang I involved an unconsented-to autopsy, it is not difficult to
imagine this same scenario playing out with regard to an unconsented-to organ procurement.
197
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The Alternatives
1. Combatting the Misconceptions

Most commentators agree that some commonly held misconceptions about organ donation contribute to the organ shortage in the
202
United States. Thus, all that may be needed to increase the organ
donation rate in the United States is increased public education and
203
awareness about organ donation.
a. Religion
As discussed in Section IV, opinions vary as to the acceptance of
cadaveric organ donation among the various religious traditions. It is
apparent, however, that at least some major religions do not prohibit
204
cadaveric organ donation, but rather embrace it as an act of charity.
Still, many people in the United States believe that their religion pro205
Thus, increased education
hibits or frowns upon organ donation.
and awareness concerning religious attitudes towards organ donation
would certainly help to combat this common misconception.
b. A Culture of Distrust
A lack of public trust in the American healthcare system is
viewed as another obstacle to improving the organ donation rate in
206
the United States. As demonstrated in the recent debates surrounding “Obamacare,” this lack of trust can lead to public fear.207 Many
individuals still fear that their status as an organ donor will impact the
quality of medical care they will receive in life-threatening situations.208 Further, as discussed in Section IV, abuse of medical research

202 See Busting the Myths About Organ Donation, GIFT OF LIFE DONOR PROGRAM,
http://www.donors1.org/learn/myths/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
203 See id.; Watkins, supra note 8, at 6; Fitzgibbons supra note 4, at 85; see also About Us ,
supra note 17; see also Awareness & Promotion, supra note 17.
204 See O’Keeffe, supra note 150, at 292; UNOS, supra note 181; DONATELIFE.NET, supra
note 181.
205 See UNOS, supra note 181.
206 Although many factors undoubtedly contribute to this lack of trust, the poor quality
(both real and perceived) of our healthcare system must be among them. See Vidya Ram, Solving the Organ Crisis, the Spanish Way , FORBES.COM (Sep. 2, 2009, 6:00 PM EST),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/02/public-private-healthcare-business-healthcare-organdonation.html. Of note, Spain, with the highest organ donation rate in the world, has the seventh-best healthcare system in the world. Id. The United States, however, ranks thirty-seventh.

Id.
207
208

See Ram, supra note 206.
See Sayani, supra note 103; UNOS, supra note 181.
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in the past has resulted in widespread mistrust of the medical establishment within certain racial and cultural groups.
c. Brain Death
Misconceptions surrounding the concept of brain death also act
as an impediment to increasing the organ donation rate in the United
209
Polls show that people still refuse to donate a loved one’s
States.
organs when the loved one has been declared brain dead because they
are under the mistaken belief that a person can “recover” from a di210
agnosis of brain death. In reality, however, brain death is irreversi211
ble and serves, in many jurisdictions, as a legal indicator of death.
Thus, increased public awareness and education about brain death
may result in the availability of an entirely new pool of organ donors.212
2. Financial Incentives
Beyond presumed consent and increasing awareness of organ
donation, financial incentives present another means of increasing
organ donation. Financial incentives are an attractive option because
they offer a variety of choice. Indeed, states have employed various
types of financial incentives aimed at encouraging organ donation,
specifically from the perspective of eliciting family members’ con213
sent. Pennsylvania piloted a program whereby a family consenting
to the donation of a decedent’s organ(s) was given $300 towards a
214
funeral home of choice. Other proposals have included tax credits
for those who consent to donation.215 Of course, financial incentives
raise ethical concerns and fears of exploitation. However, financial
incentives raise considerably less concerns than their controversial
counterpart, the organ market.
216

A Regulated Organ Market

209

See Roberts, supra note 61, at 112.

210

Jacqueline Sullivan, Debbie L. Seem, & Franki Chabalewski, Determining Brain Death,
http://classic.aacn.org/aacn/jrnlccn.nsf/0/5ebf8de743ead0fa8825674e005a8950?opendocument
(last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
211
212
213
214
215

See id.
See Roberts, supra note 61, at 112.
See id. at 111.
See id.
See Appel, supra note 47.

216 This section will only examine legal organ markets. While the existence of illegal and
unregulated black market organ trading throughout the world is undisputed, it merits a separate
discussion not relevant here. For more information about the international illegal organ trade,
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Since federal law prohibits the sale of organs, a regulated organ
market is not currently a realistic option for the United States.217
There are those, however, that think it is time for Congress to rethink, or even repeal, the prohibition on the sale of organs in light of
the organ donor crisis.218 However, the idea of a regulated organ mar219
ket is not popular with Americans, and their experiences are both
cautionary and illuminating. The sale of human organs has, at one
time or another, been legal in three countries—the Philippines, India,
and Iran.220 Due to ethical concerns, India’s legal organ market was
brought to an end in 1994 with the passage of the Transplantation of
Human Organs Act.221 Similarly, the Philippines maintained a legal
organ market until the passage of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
222
223
in 2009. In Iran, however, the organ market is alive and well. In
fact, Iran’s legal kidney market is viewed by some as an example of
what a well-regulated and standardized legal organ market could look
like in the United States.224 Although, obviously not a perfect system,
Iran’s legal kidney market has been successful.225 Perhaps the greatest
see Yosuke Shimazono, The State of the International Organ Trade: A Provisional Picture
Based on Integration of Available Information, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
http://www.who.int/
bulletin/volumes/85/12/06-039370/en/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
217 See 42 U.S.C. § 274(e) (2010). The 2006 UAGA also prohibits the sale of body parts.
See Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 16 (2009), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/anatomical_gift/uaga_final_aug09.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2012).
218 See Benjamin E. Hippen, Organ Sales and Moral Travails: Lessons from the Living
Kidney Vendor Program in Iran, CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY ANALYSIS, POLICY ANALYSIS NO.
614, at 1, 3 (2008), available at http://www.cato. org/publications/policy-analysis/organ-salesmoral-travails-lessons-living-kidney-vendor-program-iran; Stephen J. Dubner, Human Organs
for Sale, Legally, in . . . Which Country?, FREAKONOMICS, (Apr. 29, 2008, 4:20 PM),
http://freakonomics.
blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/human-organs-for-sale-legally-in-which-country/.
219 Consistently, polls show that public opinion is overwhelmingly against the idea of a
regulated organ market. See Roberts, supra note 61; Dubner, supra note 218 (“The repugnance
factor in this country [to a regulated organ market] . . . may simply be too large to overcome.”).
220 See Dubner, supra note 218; Amendment to the Transplantation of Human Organs Act,
1994, LAW RESOURCE INDIA, http://indialawyers.wordpress.com/2009/09/19/mendment-to-thetransplantation-of-human-organs-act-1994/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2011); Rasheed Abou-Alsamh,
Cabral Warns: No More Organs for Sale in Philippines, ARAB NEWS (June 26, 2009),
http://archive.arabnews.com/?page=4&section=0&article=124049; Tetch Torres, Philippines
Says No to Organ Trafficking, INQUIRER GLOBAL NATION (June 24, 2009), http://globalnation.
inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20090624-212208/Philippines-says-no-to-organ-trafficking;
see also Appel, supra note 47.
221 See Amendment to the Transplantation of Human Organ Acts, 1994, supra note 220.
222 See Abou-Alsamh, supra note 220; Torres, supra note 220.
223 Iran is currently the only country in the world with a legal organ market. See Dubner,
supra note 218; Shimazono, supra note 216.
224 See Hippen, supra note 218.
225 See id. Although, there is an acknowledged lack of data regarding the long-term outcomes for donors. See id. at 5.

FIU Law Review

178

[7:149

proof of its success is the fact that, as of 1999, Iran had eliminated its
226
waiting list for kidney transplants.
Under the Iranian system, paid kidney donors (“kidney vendors”) are identified and matched to recipients by the Dialysis and
Transplant Patients Association (DATPA).227 DATPA is staffed by
volunteers and receives no compensation for facilitating the matching
228
program. Thus, DATPA serves the important role of neutral intermediary between the kidney vendors and transplant recipients.229
Kidney vendors are paid a flat fee of $1,200 from the Iranian govern230
They are also given limited
ment for the donation of a kidney.
health insurance policies to cover only those medical issues that arise
secondary to the transplantation surgery.231 Moreover, kidney vendors
receive a second payment – typically between $2,300 and $4,500 –from
either the recipient, if s/he can afford it, or a designated charitable
organization.232 The compensation to the kidney vendor, however, is
not solely monetary.233 The Iranian government also pays for all
transplant-associated medical care, for both the kidney vendor and
234
the recipient.
The Iranian experience with organ markets is enlightening in two
ways. First, while the Iranian legal kidney market pertains only to
living kidney vendors, it is not difficult to imagine such a system being
implemented for deceased donors as well.235 Second, a cursory accounting of the pros and cons of the Iranian kidney market reveals
that it presents no worse an alternative and about the same risks as an
explicit consent system, and perhaps a better alternative and fewer
risks than a presumed consent system. For instance, the Iranian kidney market relies on the explicit consent of kidney vendors.236 Thus, it
preserves individual autonomy and privacy at least as well as an explicit consent system, and certainly better than a presumed consent

226
227
228
229

See id. at 4.
See id. at 3.
See id.
See id. at 3-4. (“Neither the transplant center nor transplant physicians are involved in

identifying potential vendors.”).
230 See id.
231 See id. These limited health insurance policies are in effect for one year following the
transplantation surgery. See id.
232
233
234

See id.
See id.
See id.

235 Of course, some tweaks would obviously be needed. For example, provisions would
have to be made for compensation to go either to the decedent’s estate or next-of-kin.
236 See id. at 3 (“Neither the transplant center nor transplant physicians are involved in
identifying potential vendors. Instead, vendors express their own interest in participating by
contacting DATPA.”).
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system. Further, at worst, it raises the same ethical concerns with respect to disparate impact and exploitation of the poor as does pre237
sumed consent.
Moreover, despite the fact that many Americans morally object
to the idea of an organ market, one must admit that it comports nicely
with the notion of capitalism and the American market economy.
Thus, with the proper safeguards and regulations in place, a legal organ market may prove to be a missed opportunity for increasing organ
donation rates in the United States.
3. Reciprocity in Israel
Israel recently became the first country in the world to incentivize organ donation by implementing a reciprocal organ donation sys238
tem. Under such a system, individuals who consent to being organ
donors are given priority over those who do not if they ever find
themselves in the unfortunate position of needing an organ transplant
themselves.239 Israeli officials hope that the prospect of receiving priority treatment is a sufficient incentive to increase Israel’s low organ
240
donation rates.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRESUMED CONSENT
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
Under the Court’s modern interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, whenever the government deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property, the government must offer that
person some sort of procedural due process, i.e., notice and the right
241
The property interests protected by the Fourteenth
to be heard.
Amendment are not created by the Constitution.242 Rather, they are
the products of rules and understandings established by independent
sources — such as state law, common policy and practice, or precedent.243 However, the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth

237
238
239
240
241

See id. at 5.
See Rampell, supra note 19; Appel, supra note 47.
See Rampell, supra note 19.
See id.
See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (“The requirements of procedural

due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”).
242 See id. at 577.
243 See id.
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Amendment find their source in both state law and the Constitution.
Presumed consent organ donation laws implicate deprivations of both
liberty and property. Thus, in examining the constitutionality of presumed consent organ donation laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, one must first address the question of whether presumed consent laws have the potential to deprive people of either liberty or
property.245 If the answer to this question is yes, the next question
must then be what process is due?246 As discussed below, several
courts have had occasion to pass on the first question with varying
247
results. Nevertheless, some courts have concluded that next-of-kin
have cognizable and protected property interests in a decedent’s
body.248 These precedents will undoubtedly provide the predominant
basis for objections to presumed consent organ donation laws as a
deprivation of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.
1. The Property Interest of Next of Kin
In Brotherton v. Cleveland, the decedent’s wife brought suit
against the county coroner after discovering that her deceased husband’s corneas had been removed during an autopsy without her con249
sent. At the hospital, the wife declined to give consent to the dona250
tion of her husband’s organs. Subsequently, because the husband’s
death was ruled a possible suicide, his body was taken to the county
coroner’s office where an autopsy was performed.251 During the autopsy, the county coroner authorized, pursuant to an Ohio presumed
consent law, the removal of the husband’s corneas for the purposes of
donation.252 The coroner did not make any effort to ask either the
decedent’s wife or the hospital whether there was any objection to
244 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[The government] may not deny a
benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests . . . .”).
245 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND NOTES 502
(8th ed. 2007).
246 See id. It would seem that the subsidiary issue of when the process is due is moot in the
organ donation context. Objections to the donation of a decedent’s organs are raised before
said donation, either by the decedent himself or next-of-kin. For the process to be meaningful at
all, it would have to be offered before a decedent’s organs are removed, since process after
removal would not leave any opportunity to rectify an alleged deprivation.
247 See Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2010); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d
477 (6th Cir. 1991).
248 See Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 477; Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir.
2002).
249 See Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478.
250 See id. at 478.
251 See id.
252

See id.
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such a donation.253 The Ohio presumed consent law, under which the
coroner acted, allowed for the removal of corneas for transplantation
as long as the coroner’s office was not aware “of an objection by the
decedent, the decedent’s spouse, or [ ]. . . the next of kin . . . .”254 Further, it had become the common practice of the coroner’s office to not
seek out the next of kin’s consent or inspect the decedent’s medical or
hospital records.255
In addressing the wife’s due process claim, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals first pointed out that historically, other courts have
found that next of kin have a “quasi-property interest” in a decedent’s
dead body.256 Nevertheless, the court found that it was unnecessary to
257
address the merits of this finding. Instead, the court concluded that
section 2108.02(B) of the Ohio statutes granted an explicit right to the
decedent’s wife to control the disposal of her husband’s body.258 In so
doing, the court found that the statute effectively gave the decedent’s
wife a possessory interest in her husband’s dead body which rose to a
sufficient level as to create a “‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ . . . protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth Amendment.”259 Further, although acknowledging that the right to possess is
at “the very core of a property interest,”260 the court emphasized that
the question of whether an interest rises to the level of due process
protection rests on the substance of the right rather than the label
261
attached to it by the State. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit’s holding
was significant in that it (1) acknowledged that next of kin have a cognizable and constitutionally protected interest in a decedent’s dead
body, and (2) that this interest is substantial enough to warrant some
form of predeprivation process under the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause.262 However, the court did not elaborate as to
what this predeprivation process should look like or how extensive it
263
should be.
Similarly, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, the Ninth Circuit held
that the parents of children whose corneas had been removed by the
Los Angeles County Coroner’s office, without consent and pursuant
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 480.
See id. at 481-82.
See id. at 482.
Id.
Id. at 481.
See id. at 482.
See id.
See id.
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to a California presumed consent law, stated a valid claim under Title
42, United States Code, section 1983 for violation of the Due Process
264
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, where the Brotherton court had been hesitant to put a
label on the interest it deemed worthy of due process protection, the
Newman court explicitly recognized that a next-of-kin’s exclusive
right to possess a decedent’s dead body directly translated into a cognizable and constitutionally protected property interest.265 Yet, as in
Brotherton, the Newman court stopped short of explaining “the type
and extent of predeprivation process” due.266
In addition, the Newman case is significant for another reason –
its factual underpinnings aptly demonstrate the potential for abuse
posed by presumed consent laws. The Newman case arose out of an
exposé in the Los Angeles Times chronicling the Los Angeles County
Coroner’s rather sketchy practices surrounding presumed consent
cornea donations.267 Not only did the article reveal that the coroner
went out of his way to avoid any knowledge of next-of-kin objections,
it also revealed that the primary motivation for such practices was
monetary.268 The coroner’s office was selling the corneas to a forprofit tissue bank and earning approximately $250,000 per year by
269
doing so.
Nineteen years later, in Albrecht v. Treon, the Sixth Circuit reinforced the significance of Brotherton for the purpose of analyzing the
constitutionality of presumed consent organ donation laws. Although
it declined to extend Brotherton beyond the scope of the organ donation context,270 the Albrecht court clarified any doubt as to the nature
271
of the interest the Brotherton Court had seen fit to protect. According to the Albrecht court, the property interest protected in Brotherton arose directly from Ohio state law, “which expressly granted next
272
of kin the right to [possess and] dispose of a relative’s remains.”
Further, the Albrecht court explained that, within the organ donation
264

See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002).
See id.; Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
266 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482; see Newman, 287 F.3d at 799.
267 See Orentlicher, supra note 14, at 306.
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]his Court and the Supreme
Court of Ohio agree that Brotherton applies only in the narrow circumstance of unauthorized
265

removal of body parts for donations, and should not be expanded to include claims by next of
kin for bodily tissues retained by a government official for legitimate criminal investigations.”).
271 See id. at 898. (“Brotherton did not create a property interest in the next of kin's deceased relative's corneas, but, instead, interpreted that right as it already existed pursuant to
Ohio's Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.”).
272 Id. at 894.
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context, the next of kin’s property interests in the decedent’s dead
body were paramount to any state property interests that existed.273
Finally, the Albrecht court repeatedly distinguished Brotherton and
emphasized that its seemingly contrary holding turned on one “key
difference.” 274 Whereas the removal of the brain in Albrecht was “in
275
furtherance of a lawful criminal investigation,” there was no such
investigative purpose behind the removal of the corneas in Brotherton. Rather, in Brotherton, the corneas were removed for the sole
276
Accordingly, Brotherton not only repurpose of organ donation.
mains good law but has been fortified by Albrecht.277 Consequently, it
will inevitably serve as the launching point for the many constitutional
challenges that are sure to be mounted against presumed consent organ donation laws.
B.

The Liberty Interest of the Deceased

Although the liberty interest of the deceased has been focused
upon less frequently by claimants and the courts, it remains a viable,
though perhaps tenuous, means of challenging the constitutionality of
presumed consent laws. Inherently linked to autonomy, the policy
side of the liberty argument was discussed above in Section IV. Here,
it is worthwhile to examine the constitutional side of the liberty argument.
In a seemingly insignificant part of its opinion, the Newman court
actually seems to give a preview of how the liberty argument could
278
Personal liberty,
play-out from the constitutional law perspective.
the court points out, “is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people279 . . . as to be ranked as one of the fundamental liberties
protected by the substantive component of the Due Process
280
The court further explains that, according to the United
Clause.”
States Supreme Court, this sphere of personal liberty includes “the
right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others . . . .”281 Moreover,
the court notes that the Supreme Court has “strongly suggested” that
273

See id.
Id. at 897.
275 Id.
276 See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 478, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
277 See Albrecht, 617 F.3d at 897 (“[T]his Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio agree that
Brotherton applies only in the narrow circumstance of unauthorized removal of body parts for
274

donations . . . .”).
278 See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 789-90 (9th Cir. 2002).
279 Id. at 789 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)).
280 Id. (citations omitted).
281 Id. (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)) (emphasis added).
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this protected liberty interest “extends to the personal decisions about
282
how to best protect dignity and independence at the end of life.”
Thus, according to Newman, one may not need to rely on a next-ofkin objection in order to mount an attack against presumed consent
laws. If personal liberty is indeed a fundamental right, it carries with
it the full force of our constitutional protections by way of a strict
scrutiny standard of review. And if personal liberty encompasses end
of life decisions, such as organ donation, then laws pertaining to organ
donation must withstand strict scrutiny review, i.e., the laws must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.283
Another aspect of the liberty argument against presumed consent
laws is provided by the fact that fundamental rights need not be affirmatively invoked.284 By their very nature, fundamental rights are a
constitutional given, as is the protection they receive.285 If, as discussed above, the personal liberty with which organ donation laws are
concerned is a fundamental right, a presumed consent organ donation
system stands in direct contradiction to this tenet of constitutional
law. Under a presumed consent system, an individual’s default status
becomes constitutionally unprotected unless s/he affirmatively invokes or activates the protection of the Due Process Clause by “opting-out.” This proposition flies directly in the face of Supreme Court
precedents interpreting the nature of the fundamental rights protected by the Federal Constitution.286
C.

The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause

In addition, the recognition of next-of-kins’ property interests in
the dead body of a decedent has obvious implications under the Tak287
The Takings
ings Clause of the incorporated Fifth Amendment.
Clause provides that private property shall not “be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”288 Assuming arguendo that a decedent’s body is the private property of the next-of-kin, one could certainly argue that presumed consent laws, which authorize the removal
of a decedent’s organ(s) for the purpose of organ donation without
compensation to the next-of-kin, constitute a “taking” under the Fifth
Amendment. The “public use” requirement of the Takings Clause
282
283
284
285
286
287

See id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)).
See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 525 (1999)
See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 458; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489.
See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 458; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 489.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.

226, 233-34 (1897)
288 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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can be satisfied by an expressed intent that the “taking” serve a generalized “public purpose”. 289 Presumably then, the public purpose in
the context of presumed consent organ donation laws would be that of
increasing cadaveric organ donation rates, with the end result being
that more lives are saved.
In this scenario, a state government’s only means of avoiding the
“takings” problem would be to compensate the affected decedent’s
next of kin. However, such a proposal would raise many controversial
questions. How would a decedent’s organs be valuated, according to
the value assigned to them by the State, the decedent, the decedent’s
next of kin, or the organ recipient? Should the valuation be done pre
or post death? Should organ values be uniform by type, regardless of
the identity of the donor? Or should who the donor is factor into the
valuation? If so, what factors should be considered in the valuation of
an organ? Race? Sex? Religion? How about a decedent’s level of
education, earning potential, or family history? Certainly, the age and
overall health of the decedent should be taken into account since such
characteristics may contribute significantly to the quality of the procured organ.
But what role, if any, should the identity of the organ recipient
play? Should the value of the life potentially saved factor into the
equation? Should the aforementioned factors also come into play on
the side of the organ recipient? Should an organ be valued greater if
it is going to save the life of a young person versus that of an older
person? How about if the organ recipient is married and has children,
versus an individual who is single and has fewer dependents? Perhaps
the difficulties posed by these questions are proof that we should not
go down the road of “body as property”. However, as evidenced by
Brotherton, Newman, and Albrecht, in the area of organ donation
law, we are not far off this course.
Notably, in the little case law that exists in the area, courts have
managed to avoid the mere mention of the looming Takings Clause
290
problem. Perhaps this is wishful thinking on their part. Nevertheless, if attempts like the one in New York gain traction and succeed,
courts will undoubtedly be forced to address the question of whether
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause protects “quasi” property
rights, as it does fully vested property rights.

289 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
290 See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002); Albrecht v. Treon, 617
F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2010); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Is presumed consent the answer to the organ shortage crisis in
the United States? And even if it is, is it an answer that will be acceptable to the American people? Moreover, considering the inequities that have plagued presumed consent laws thus far, is it a just answer?
As things stand right now, the answer to all of these questions is
most likely no. The American people cherish their autonomy and
privacy too much to view presumed consent laws as anything other
than a direct affront to their personal liberty. And while the American courts may be more receptive to presumed consent laws as a valid
exercise of the state police powers, they inevitably will have to deal
with some very sticky constitutional issues should state-wide opt-out
systems become a reality.
To be sure, there are alternatives. As offensive as some Americans may find the idea of offering financial incentives or remuneration
for donor organs, such options may prove more palatable and consistent with American values than presumed consent. Reciprocity
also seems promising. Further, increasing the organ donation rates
may be as simple as increasing education and public awareness about
organ donation. In light of the values at stake, the alternatives must
be worth exploring.
The future for presumed consent organ donation laws in the
United States is uncertain. However, the controversy surrounding
them is not. And yet the states seem undeterred in their quest to be
the first in the nation to boast an opt-out organ donation system.
Time will only tell.

